Fundamentals of the Formula of Humanity in .NET Generating gs1 datamatrix barcode in .NET Fundamentals of the Formula of Humanity

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8.7 Fundamentals of the Formula of Humanity use .net framework ecc200 printing touse gs1 datamatrix barcode on .net .NET Framework The prospects for the datamatrix 2d barcode for .NET Formula of Universal Law s generating a set of duties acceptable to ordinary moral reason do not appear to be good. Are the prospects for the Formula of Humanity any better Kant himself seems to favor the Formula of Humanity as a basis on which to derive duties.

For in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant relies (at least implicitly) on this formula to derive the vast majority of the ethical duties he sets out.24 But given Kant s suggestion that the two formulas are equivalent (GMS 436), perhaps he favors the Formula of Humanity simply because in his view it is less cumbersome to work with than the other formula. At any rate, I do not offer anything approaching an exhaustive treatment of the issue of whether the Formula of Humanity would generate a plausible set of duties relative to ordinary moral thinking.

However, I do hope to say enough to suggest that, although the Formula of Humanity holds signi cant promise, defenders of it must confront some troubling issues. Before we can discuss the question of which duties would stem from this formula (if it was valid), we need to understand the terms it employs. Unfortunately, like the Formula of Universal Law, it is not easy to interpret.

The Formula of Humanity commands: So act that you treat humanity, whether. Conclusion: Kant s Candidates in your own person or Data Matrix ECC200 for .NET in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. An agent s acting so that she treats humanity (in herself or any other) as an end is a necessary and suf cient condition for her conforming to the formula.

It is a necessary condition since the formula commands that an agent so act that she always treat humanity as an end. It is a suf cient condition since even if the agent acts so that she treats humanity in herself or another as a means, as long as she at the same time acts so that she treats it as an end, she has conformed to the formula.25 So, at bottom, the Formula of Humanity amounts to a command so to act that we always treat humanity as an end.

26 Humanity, let us recall, does not refer to the class of human beings but rather to a set of capacities: the capacities to set oneself ends and to adopt and act on rules, including rules of prudence (hypothetical imperatives) and rules of morality (categorical imperatives), often in pursuit of these ends. Would duties acceptable to ordinary moral reason stem from the command always to treat humanity so understood as an end An initial step toward answering this question is to examine the sense of end or, equivalently, end in itself at work in the Formula of Humanity.27 Kant holds that humanity exists as an end in itself.

But what does it mean for humanity to exist in this way First, as we know from our discussion of Kant s derivation of this formula, an end in itself is something that has absolute or unconditional worth (GMS 428). It would be judged by an impartial rational spectator to be good in every possible context, even in ones in which it brought about undesired results. For Kant that an end in itself has absolute worth implies that all rational agents must (are rationally compelled to) value it and to act in ways that express their valuing it, regardless of whether they are inclined to do so (section 3.

2). Second, to say that humanity exists as an end in itself is to say that it has dignity (GMS 435; MS 434 435, 462). To have dignity, Kant suggests, is to have unconditional and incomparable worth (GMS 436).

We have just noted what it means to have the rst aspect of dignity, namely unconditional worth. Kant explains the second aspect of dignity, namely incomparable worth, by contrasting it with price: What has a price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent ; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity (GMS 434; see also MS 462). The value of something with dignity, then, is incomparable in the sense that it has no equivalent for which it can be exchanged.

As Thomas Hill has argued, that it is seems to have two implications.28 First (and quite clearly), something with dignity can never be legitimately sacri ced for or replaced by something with price. Not even all the gold in Fort Knox would compensate for the killing of one rational agent.

Second (and not quite so clearly), something with dignity cannot even be legitimately sacri ced for or replaced by something else with dignity. Beings with dignity, says Kant, admit of no equivalent. If, therefore, it is ever legitimate to kill one being.

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