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in producing intentions, but, this mental counterpart is the acknowledgement and the adoption of the norm N itself. N works as a N only when the agents recognize it as a N, use it as a N, conceive it as a N (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995). Norm emergence and formation implies what we call cognitive emergence : the explicit mental representation of norm (thus cognitive agents).

A social N is really a N only after its cognitive emergence (see 3.2.1; Castelfranchi, 1998b).

As long as the agents interpret the normative behavior of the group merely as a statistical norm, and comply by imitation, the real normative character of the N remains unacknowledged, and the ef cacy of such misunderstood N is quite limited. Only when the normative (which implies prescriptive ) character of the N becomes acknowledged by the agent the N starts to operate ef caciously as a N through the true normative behavior of that agent. Thus the effective cognitive emergence of N in the agent s mind is a precondition for the social emergence of the N in the group, for its ef cacy and complete functioning as a N.

Notice that this CE is partial: for their working it is not necessary that social Ns as a macro-phenomenon be completely understood and transparent to the agents. What is necessary (and suf cient) is that the agents recognize the prescriptive and non-personal character of the N; the entitled authority, and the implicit pretence of the N to protect or enforce some group-interest (which may be against particular interests). It is not necessary that the involved agents (for example the addressee or the controller) understand or agree about the speci c function or purpose of that N.

They should respect it because it is a N (or, sub-ideally, thanks to surveillance and sanctions), but in any case because they understand that it is a N, and do not mix it up with a diffused habit or a personal order or expectation. Norms, to work as norms, cannot remain unconscious to the addressee, but the agent can remain absolutely ignorant of the emerging effects of the prescribed behavior in many kinds of Norm-adoption (Conte and Castelfranchi, 1995) . Normative behavior has to be intentional and conscious: it has to be based on knowledge of the norm (prescription), but this does not necessarily imply consciousness and intentionality relative to all the functions of the norm.

3.2 Mind Is Not Enough: Objective Social Structures and Emergent Forms of Cooperation Against the Hyper-Cognitive View. Given the ability of cognitive agents to have representations of others minds, the social world, and their interactions, a wrong interpretation of the initial thesis can follow.

To claim that social action and functioning at the macro-level are implemented in and work through the individual minds of the agents is not the same as. Cognitive Architecture a nd Contents for Social Structures and Interactions 371 claiming that this macro-social functioning is re ected in the minds of the agents, is represented in them, known, and deliberately or contractually constructed. A large part of the macro-social phenomena works thanks to the agents mental representations but without being mentally represented. How is this possible Cognitive mediators of social action or mental counterparts of social phenomena (like norms, values, functions, etc.

) are not necessarily synonyms of cognitive representation and awareness of them (see later Section 3.3). Conte and Castelfranchi (1995) call the hyper-cognitive view and subjectivism the reduction of social structures, social roles and organization, social cooperation, to the beliefs, the intentions, the shared and mutual knowledge, the commitments of the agents.

Agents are modeled as having in their minds the representations of their social links. These links seem to hold precisely by virtue of the fact that they are known or intended (subjectivism): any social phenomenon (be it global cooperation, the group, or an organization) is explicitely represented in the agents minds (such as Harr , 1993) and even consists of such representations (such as Bond, 1989; e Bond and Gasser, 1988; Gasser, 1991). 3.

2.1 Objective Social Structures Some social structures are deliberately constructed by the agents through explicit or implicit negotiation (at least partially; for example role structures in organizations); others are emerging in an objective way. Let us focus in particular on one structure: the network of interdependencies, not only because it is the most basic one for social theory, but also because it is emerging before and beyond any social action, contract, and decision of the involved agents.

An Emergent Objective Structure: The Dependence Network. There is interference (either positive or negative) between two agents if the effects of the actions of the former can affect (favor or damage) the goals/outcomes of the other (Castelfranchi, 1998a). Among interfering agents, there is dependence when an agent needs an action or a resource of the other agent to ful ll one (or more) of its goals.

The structure of interference and interdependence among a population of agents is an emergent and objective one, independent of the agents awareness and decisions, but it constrains the agents actions by determining their success and ef cacy. Given a group of agents in a common world, and given their goals and their different and limited abilities and resources, they are interdependent on each other: a dependence structure emerges. In fact, given agent A with its goal Ga, and its plan Pa for Ga, and given the fact that this plan requires actions a1 and a2 and resource r1, if agent A is able to do a1 and a2 and.

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